By Jerry Smith, OBE, CHC Consulting
There have been no successful terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material in the UK or other developed economies over the past 12 months. However, terrorists retain the intent to employ such weapons against the UK, due to their potential to kill and maim on a large scale, and their outsized psychological impact relative to conventional Methodology.
While the challenges for non-state actors for successfully acquiring, weaponizing and deploying CBRN material means such attacks are unlikely, advances in technology and the dissemination of terrorist tradecraft online have reduced these barriers. Furthermore, the continued use of chemical weapons by state actors has underlined the fragility of arms control agreements and increased the risk of proliferation to terrorist groups. Equally, while Daesh’s territorial collapse in Iraq and Syria has limited the groups ability to develop and deploy CBRN weapons, the phenomenon of returning fighters may have dispersed those members with relevant knowledge, increasing the risk of CBRN attacks in other regions.
Eighteen months after the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, Salisbury’s economy continues to suffer from decontamination and clean-up operations and business interruption costs. This relatively small incident also put significant pressure on emergency services and specialist responders, underlining the potential for CBRN attacks to overwhelm authorities and cause catastrophic human and financial losses.
With most losses in such a scenario likely to arise from the response of the authorities and the public, business should prepare for such a crisis by planning and rehearsing relocation and alternative work systems as part of their resilience preparation. This should include appropriate crisis communication tools to reassure and inform perceptions to ensure that fear, uncertainty and doubt do not unnecessarily exacerbate the situation.
Chemical Attacks
As the Syrian conflict moves to its next phase, there has been a reduction in the reporting of chemical weapon attacks. Along with the improving fortunes of the Assad regime, it is possible that the successful introduction of an attribution mechanism within the chemical weapons treaty guardians, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), has been a measure of deterrence. The self-same organisation sent an international team of investigators to conduct independent analysis of the Salisbury attack, with their results supporting the UK’s identification of Novichok, a rare and super-toxic nerve agent.
A previous poisoning attack in 2017 occurred against Kim Jong-nam, the half-brother of the current North Korean leader, who was killed by VX nerve agent in Kuala Lumpur airport departures. The nature of the attack and the chosen poison suggests that the use of a chemical weapon for targeted extra-judicial killings remains a tool for governments, content to have implausible deniability of their direct actions.
Whilst these two events were not declared as terrorism, the blurring of division between state and non-state actors means it is entirely conceivable that a future use of chemicals in an attack could be contracted out to a proxy organisation into what could be defined as a terrorist attack.
Biological Convergence
Biological attacks thankfully remain even more infrequent than that of chemical events. Though biological weapons have been used in war for centuries, the challenges of producing an effective weaponised pathogen remain elusive. However, the smaller scale use of toxins (naturally occurring poisons) by non-state actors has been seen on recent occasions. Two individuals in Cologne are currently accused of acquiring and preparing to use ricin, a toxin from the castor bean plant, in a terror attack in Germany.
On a wider scale, we have seen the enduring tragedy of the Ebola outbreak in DRC. Whilst this has not originated from malicious intent, it has certainly been exacerbated by violent non-state actors, as well as an under-developed healthcare system. Although there is little direct link to the UK, the outbreak and the international community’s reaction, indicates how a response to an affected population could have a substantial impact on outcomes.
There is also significant concern around the increasing levels of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), whereby harmful bacteria are evolving immunity to many antibiotic drugs. Warnings have already been given by a number of government health organisations. Without integrated and coordinated action, there is a realistic possibility that previously treatable diseases and infections will again become a risk to human health. The US Biomedical Advance Research and Development Authority (BARDA) considers AMR now to be a homeland security issue not only because of the reduction in capability to treat a malicious bacterial attack, but also because it threatens the viability of mass medical intervention in the case of a conventional terrorist event.
Nuclear Proliferation
Understandably, nuclear threat concerns tend to focus on weapons and, more recently, the development efforts by Russia of a missile propelled by a nuclear engine. State-on-State issues, be it US-Iran or Pakistan-India, may appear remote. But a growth in weapon numbers, particularly of smaller battlefield systems, potentially increases the vulnerability of illicit acquisition by a non-state actor with intentions of deployment in the West.
Perhaps of more strategic interest is the upwards trend in the construction of nuclear power plants, with over 450 facilities in use globally and responsible for generating 11% of the worlds electricity. A number of countries, including Russia and South Korea, now have turn-key plants available for sale. The nuclear safety watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a number of well-established rules around reactors capable of making nuclear material for weaponisation. So, the principal risk is more to do with the acquisition and use of nuclear fuel as a radiological weapon, rather than that of a bomb. With nuclear plants now being constructed in developing nations, there is a risk that financial constraints could lead to the IAEA-mandated safety and security governance not being followed as well as they should be. This again could be an opportunity for terrorists to acquire material for use in some form of improvised device.
New Technologies
The increasing civilian use and technological advances of UAVs (drones) have the potential to allow terrorist actors to deploy toxic material directly to a target. Such delivery systems can be built or modified to overcome a range of control measures, such as geo-fencing and GPS location spoofing, although this requires a degree of specialist knowledge beyond the capability of many terrorist actors. However, consideration of further drone countermeasures is likely to continue apace.
The use of a cyber means to disrupt industrial control systems (ICS) is another area where hazardous industrial material; be it chemical, biological or radiological in nature, could be maliciously released. There is increasing recognition that more must be done to ensure cyber security extends to ICS networks.
Perhaps the most troubling technology issue on the horizon is that of synthetic biology. Warnings from organisations as disparate as the World Economic Forum, the Wellcome Foundation and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) all express concern that the advent of advanced gene manipulation could change the global risk assessment for so-called designer pathogens. In 2017, a Canadian university was able to purchase various biological materials that allowed them to make the horsepox virus in the university laboratory. Whilst this is harmless to humans, experts state that it is not a great leap to alter a number of elements to develop a human pathogen, such as smallpox. Such a disease could have a devastating impact on a population.
UK reforms CBRN response capability
In the wake of the Salisbury poisoning attack, the government announced £48m to fund a new Chemical Weapons Defence Centre in addition to an £11m to boost the development of broader counter-CBRN capabilities. The Army has now taken responsibility for CBRN defence and formed a Royal Engineers regiment to lead a military response.
As part of the 2018 Step Change initiative, a national policing body has been driving for closer collaboration with commercial entities that contribute in supporting counterterrorism and resilience efforts. Whilst there appears to have been minimal commercial involvement in the Salisbury and Amesbury remediation work, the Department for Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) has the responsibility to lead on private sector involvement in contamination removal from a terrorist CBR attack. Defra CBRN Emergencies (formally known as the Government Decontamination Service, GDS) coordinates contractor-involvement in contamination clean-up, with suppliers typically coming from the industrial chemical and waste management sectors. It is entirely plausible that in a larger CBRN event all available resources, both civilian and military, would be required.