The ‘Virtual’ Caliphate: A Bigger Threat than Islamic State

With the impending destruction of Daesh’’s physical so-called Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the future trajectory of the organisation is unclear. However, some commentators have warned that the group will retain global influence after its territorial collapse by evolving into a ‘Virtual Caliphate’.

Broadly, the term refers to Daesh’’s use of information technology to maintain its relevance in the Jihadist movement by building support and directing or inspiring attacks. It also denotes an ideological and institutional coherence which unifies the group’’s affiliates and supporters across the disparate ungoverned spaces, both physical and digital, in which they operate.

Daesh has enjoyed considerable success in inciting sympathetic individuals with no physical contact with the group to commit attacks against the West. There have been 28 such attacks in Europe since Daesh first released its flagship publication Dabiq (since rebranded as Rumiyah) in July 2014. Some of the attackers have reportedly been guided via encrypted messaging services by Daesh handlers in Syria and Iraq. However, in most cases, the attackers are believed to have self-radicalised by viewing extremist content online. This illustrates the power of Daesh’s propaganda to cultivate support and ultimately mobilise individuals to execute attacks.

Daesh’’s media output has also disseminated instructional information aimed at increasing the efficacy of the attacks conducted by these individuals; the group has published a series of ‘do-it-yourself’ guides encouraging supporters unable to travel to the Middle East to conduct low sophistication (and therefore harder to disrupt) attacks in their home countries. Illustrative of the way that terror groups adopt each other’s successful policies, this type of material was first distributed by AQ in its Inspire magazine from 2010. However, the Methodology proposed to aspiring attackers were often more complex, and despite several notable successes, AQ was not able to instigate nearly as many attacks as Daesh subsequently would. In part, this was likely due to the more easily executed Methodology suggested by Daesh, but perhaps more significantly, Daesh’’s call to action was delivered alongside a far more extensive propaganda campaign centred on the narrative of the physical so-called Caliphate. Additionally, the string of successful attacks likely galvanised other supporters to plot their own. This dynamic was a primary driver of the step-change in threat that the UK witnessed in 2017.

The quality and quantity of Daesh’’s propaganda declined markedly as the group lost territory and key individuals were killed. Cyber operations mounted by coalition forces also degraded the group’s media capabilities and Daesh’’s ability to exploit widely used social media platforms decreased as service providers responded to government pressure to restrict extremist’s use of their platforms. Despite this, 2017 saw a major increase in the number of ‘inspired’ attacks against the UK. The difficulty of policing the internet, particularly encrypted chat services and deep and dark web forums, means that counter-terrorist efforts are unable to significantly restrict access to extremist material online. Daesh continues to produce considerable amounts of lower quality content, while AQ has mimicked their rivals by producing more accessible material focusing on instigation and instruction.

It is possible that the collapse of Daesh’’s physical so-called Caliphate will sufficiently undermine the group’s credibility such that interest in and supply of propaganda and instructional material will decrease significantly. However, as demonstrated by AQ, the loss of a safe haven need not be fatal to jihadist groups. Furthermore, the propaganda efforts of Daesh (and AQ to a lesser extent) have succeeded in
creating a corpus of extremist literature which is supported by an active community of closed chatrooms and forums. Together, these constitute an online jihadi ecosystem which exists to cultivate support for Islamist extremism and incite sympathisers to commit attacks in their home countries. In this regard, the ‘Virtual Caliphate’ is already a reality. Moreover, while content providers in this ecosystem may be affiliated with specific organisations like Daesh or AQ, their audience is largely brand agnostic. Attackers mobilised by extremist material are typically motivated by jihadi ideology in general, rather than loyalty to a specific group. Therefore, the collapse of Daesh’’s physical so-called Caliphate may do little to diminish the ability of jihadist groups to inspire attacks against the West. This development also represents a de facto merger of AQ and Daesh online, insofar as their messaging is largely indistinguishable and shares the same objective of instigating attacks by third-party actors.

Conclusion

This ‘Virtual Caliphate’ arguably has far greater implications for the UK’’s security than overseas developments. British residents will very likely continue to be radicalised by extremist content online and will use available instructional materials to plan attacks employing a range of Methodology. Inevitably, some will succeed and businesses should therefore implement mitigatory measures to protect their premises and employees from such an eventuality.