Author: Oliver Hair ASyI,
Junior Threat Analyst
Read Time: 10 minutes
The former leader of al-Qa’ida, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was reportedly killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan on 31 July 2022. al-Qa’ida has not yet confirmed the death of al-Zawahiri or announced a new leader.
As of 27 March 2023, a United Nations (UN) report has stated that an individual known as Saif-al-Adel is now considered the de facto Emir (leader) of al-Qa’ida by member states.[1] As of 15 March 2023, the US State Department has agreed that al-Adel is now the de facto Emir.[2]
This report seeks to explain and assess:
- The structure of al-Qa’ida.
- Why a new leader of al-Qa‘ida has not yet formally been announced.
- What the implications of a new al-Qa’ida leader could be to the group’s operational capabilities and strategic direction.
- al-Zawahiri’s likely successors, their possible strategic goals, and the likely operational approach of each candidate.
- What the implications of a new leader could be for the threat posed by al-Qa’ida to people and property in the UK.
This article does not discuss the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks; instead, it highlights certain factors that could influence the terrorism threat landscape in the UK in the long term.
To read further assessment on this report from Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, a Senior Research Fellow in the Terrorism & Conflict team at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), please click here.
Why is this Report Important?
- There is a realistic possibility that the announcement of a new leader could alter the intent of al-Qa’ida to focus on conducting attacks against the UK.
- al-Qa’ida maintain the intent to project threat toward the UK and the West. However, it is highly likely that the group’s affiliates are currently focused on regional priorities and lack the central direction necessary to project an external threat at this time.
- It is highly likely that al-Qa’ida will remain a long-term threat to the UK through ideological allegiances throughout the Middle East and Africa.
- al-Qa’ida has previously demonstrated the intent and capability to project a directed terrorist threat against people and property in the UK and the West:
- September 2001 – New York, US – Four commercial aircraft were hijacked by al-Qa’ida operatives. Two of the planes were crashed into the two towers of the World Trade Centre, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth into a field in proximity to Washington D.C.; reportedly intended to target either the Capitol Building or the White House. There were approximately 3000 fatalities.[3]
- July 2005 – London – Three individuals affiliated with al-Qa’ida conducted coordinated attacks on Tube trains that had departed from King’s Cross Station using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). There were 39 fatalities, and several others were injured. Another device was detonated on a London Bus in Tavistock Square.[4]
- January 2015 – Paris – Two individuals affiliated with al-Qa’ida conducted a firearms attack against the offices of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo. There were 12 fatalities, and 11 others were injured.[5]
The Organisational Structure of al-Qa'ida
Why has a new leader not been announced?
- The death of al-Zawahiri, the co-founder of al-Qa’ida, has left a void in the leadership of the group.
- There is a realistic possibility that al-Qa’ida did not have a clear plan for the appointment of a new leader following the death of al-Zawahiri. As the co-founder of al-Qa’ida, al-Zawahiri was the natural successor following the death of the group’s original leader and figurehead, Osama bin Laden. Whilst there are individuals with some of the required attributes to be the leader of al-Qa’ida, for the first time, there are no natural successors to inherit the leadership position.
- It is unlikely that there are many candidates with the necessary operational and theological experience and credibility for leadership. As such, there is a realistic possibility that the remaining senior leadership of the group could be divided over the most suitable leadership candidate and the best strategy for the development of the group going forward.
Global Security Mitigations and Geopolitical Positioning
- There is a realistic possibility that al-Qa’ida have not announced a new leader to avoid the loss of any remaining senior leadership candidates and allow covertly to develop the group’s leadership structure at a time of enduring counterterrorism threat. Counterterrorism operations have previously led to the death of former potential leadership figures, including:
- June 2015 – Nasser al-Wuhayshi – Head of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen.[6]
- September 2019 – Hamza bin Laden – Son of Osama bin Laden, and the natural successor for leadership of al-Qa’ida, was killed by US forces in a CT operation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.[7]
- September 2019 – Asim Umar – Head of al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) was allegedly killed in a joint US-Afghan raid on a Taliban compound in Helmand Province.[8]
- June 2020 – Abdelmalek Droukdel – Head of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb and a highly-respected commander in the North Africa-Sahara region was killed in a French counter terrorism operation in Mali.[9]
- August 2020 – Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah – al-Qa’ida’s second-in-command and accused of planning the 1998 African embassy bombings, was reportedly killed by Israeli operatives following a request from the US.[10] Abdullah was allegedly considered al-Qa’ida’s number two at the time.[11]
- Following al-Zawahiri’s death in Afghanistan, there is a realistic possibility that al-Qa’ida has chosen not to acknowledge his death in order to maintain positive relations with sympathetic factions of the Afghan Taliban.[12]
- In 2020, the Taliban and the US signed the Doha Agreement. As part of the agreement, the Taliban committed that they would prohibit al-Qa’ida or any other extremist organisation from “recruiting, training, and fundraising and not host them in accordance with the commitments in agreement”.[13] An announcement of the death of al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan by al-Qa’ida would openly acknowledge a direct breach of the agreement, particularly if, as media reporting suggests, al-Zawahiri was residing in a safehouse owned by a top aide to the Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, when he was killed.[14]
- It is highly likely that infighting within the Taliban has impacted the group’s willingness to acknowledge the death of al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan:
- It is highly likely that more moderate factions of the Taliban are prioritising the consolidation of domestic support as a legitimate government and an end to international sanctions imposed against it, therefore remaining averse to acknowledging al-Zawahiri’s presence in Afghanistan prior to his death.
- Alternatively, it is likely that more militant factions of the Taliban government – such as members of the Haqqani Network and Mullah Brothers – view al-Zawahiri’s death as a direct attack on their sovereignty and on al-Qa’ida; a group to which they are ideologically linked.
Theological Requirements
- Any prospective Emir would require a high level of theological understanding and experience to command the respect of al-Qa’ida senior leadership and affiliates. Both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were theological leaders and intellectual figureheads within al-Qa’ida. There is a realistic possibility that none of the current prospective leaders possess a sufficiently high level of theological authority to naturally lead the group.
- Reporting has suggested that certain leadership candidates for al-Qa’ida currently reside in Shiite-majority Iran.[15] There is a realistic possibility that this could have impacted the group’s willingness to formerly announce their new Emir. al-Qa’ida is a terrorist group that is linked predominantly with the Sunni sect of Islam and as such reporting has suggested that there is non-violent tension between al-Qa’ida and Shiite-Muslims.[16]
Who Are al-Qa’ida’s Possible Successors?
Who is Saif-al-Adel?
Saif-al-Adel (aka Muhamad Ibrahim Makkawi, Seif Al Adel, Ibrahim Al-Madani, Muhamed Salah al-din al-Halim Zaydan, Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane, Omar al-Sumali)
Reporting suggests that al-Adel is a highly respected and well-connected member of al-Qa’ida, with three-decades of experience within the group.[17] Intelligence obtained by US military forces in late 2001 suggests that al-Adel was the eighth most senior member within the organisation at that time.[18] It is almost certain that al-Adel has since risen in seniority within al-Qa’ida following successful counterterrorism operations against many of the group’s senior members. al-Adel is reportedly now based in Iran where he has lived under varying forms of arrest for many years while continuing to play a leading role in al-Qa’ida.[19]
Reports suggest that al-Adel has extensive operational experience within al-Qa’ida and is considered a capable military strategist with evidenced leadership traits, including:
- 1990s – al-Adel fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and reportedly instructed fellow fighters in the use of shoulder-mounted FIM-92 Stinger missiles to bring down Russian Hind helicopters.[20]
- 1990s – al-Adel set up training camps for al-Qa’ida in Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.[21]
- 1992 – al-Adel formed a training camp in Somalia that soon became the base for attacks against allied forces deployed under the UN peacekeeping mandate. It is alleged that a trainee of al-Adel would later be responsible for the downing of a US MH-60 Black Hawk in central Mogadishu during the Battle of Mogadishu, famously captured in the film recreation, “Black Hawk Down”.[22]
- 1998 – al-Adel remains a wanted terrorist in the US in connection with the bombings of its embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. The attacks resulted in 224 fatalities and wounded more than 5000 others.[23]
- 2000 – al-Adel is reported to have been involved in a suicide bombing attack conducted against the USS Cole destroyer in Yemen in which 17 crewmembers were killed.[24]
- 2001 – al-Adel was actively engaged in the planning of the 9/11 attacks.[25] Once the decision had been made to conduct the attacks, al-Adel immediately began searching for locations to shelter al-Qa’ida senior leadership in the aftermath.[26]
- 2011 – al-Adel was allegedly tasked with obtaining the Shura Council’s allegiance (or bayat) for al-Zawahiri due to his demonstrated loyalty to the group.[27]
What implications could al-Adel’s Leadership have for al-Qa’ida?
- At this time, it is highly likely that al-Adel would covertly pursue the development of the leadership structure of al-Qa’ida and prioritise group cohesion during ongoing counterterrorism operations against the group globally.
- If al-Adel is the Emir of al-Qa’ida, it is unlikely that he would significantly change the operational strategy of the group in the short term. al-Adel would likely focus on localised operations that ensure a more moderate Western response and deny allied forces the opportunity to focus fighting al-Qa’ida in one region
- Al-Adel has previously encouraged a focus on achieving interim goals in order to achieve the group’s longer-term objective, the establishment of a state.
- Reporting suggests that al-Adel opposed the 9/11 attacks due to concerns over the US response, the impact this would have on the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan, and al-Qa’ida’s ability to develop its external attack capabilities within the country.[28]
- Whilst it is unlikely that al-Adel would command the same level of theological respect as bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, his extensive operational experience, and his role as a trusted representative to groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida have likely earnt him the respect of affiliate leaders and the ability to unite groups throughout the Middle East and Africa.[29]
- 1992 – Somalia – Bin Laden sent al-Adel to Somalia with a vision to expand al-Qa’ida’s operations. Following the deployment of US Marines to Mogadishu in 1992, Saif established a training camp at Kaambooni. The base was later used for staging attacks against UN forces.[30]
- 1995 – Yemen – al-Adel travelled to Yemen to create a Yemeni franchise for al-Qa’ida. It is almost certain that the formation of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is a direct product of al-Adel’s initial trip in 1995.[31]
- Given his longstanding relationship with the now deceased founder of Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there is a realistic possibility that al-Adel could have the capability to attract Islamic State (IS) members back to al-Qa’ida.[32] al-Adel was reportedly a mentor to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, demonstrating his ability to lead and mentor highly capable operatives within al-Qa’ida.[33] However, there is a realistic possibility that al-Adel’s long-term residency in Shiite-majority Iran could have diminished his reputation amongst members of the Islamic State (IS).
- Whilst Saif al-Adel’s long-term residency in Iran has the potential to negatively impact his ability to communicate with and lead al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, reporting has suggested that he has previously communicated directly with affiliate branches from Iran.[34] As such, it is highly likely that if appointed as Emir whilst in Iran, al-Adel would have the capability to exert leadership influence over al-Qa’ida globally.
Who is Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi?
Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi (aka The Fox of al-Qa’ida, Muhammed Abaytah, Muhammad Abbatay, Abd al Rahman al Maghribi, Abdel Rahman al-Maghrib)
Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi is the son-in-law and former senior advisor to al-Zawahiri. al-Maghrebi had previously served as al-Qa’ida’s “general manager” in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2012 and reportedly remains a key-figure within al-Qa’ida as the director of as-Sahab, the media arm of al-Qa’ida.[35] As part of his role, al-Maghrebi allegedly coordinates activities between al-Qa’ida senior leadership and affiliate groups.[36] al-Maghrebi reportedly fled to Iran in 2001 following the fall of Afghanistan to allied forces and is now based there due to the enduring threat of counterterrorism operations.[37]
What Implications could Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi’s Leadership Have for al-Qa’ida?
- There is a realistic possibility that the familial bond between al-Maghrebi and al-Zawahiri and his extensive service under bin Laden give al-Maghrebi natural authority and prestige within al-Qa’ida.
- There is a realistic possibility that al-Maghrebi could command respect from affiliate leaders and possess the ability to unite affiliate groups throughout the Middle East and Africa due to his previous experience in a coordination role as director or as-Sahab.[38]
- Media reporting suggests that on 29 April 2023, as-Sahab released a statement titled “Congratulations and Enlightenment On the Occasion of Eid Al-Fitr 1444”. The statement allegedly instructed Muslims to support “the mujahideen” to “achieve real independence from Zio-Crusader domination”.[39]
- There is a realistic possibility that al-Maghrebi’s limited operational experience could lead him to rely on more experienced members of al-Qa’ida to direct the group’s operational strategy, such as Saif al-Adel.
- al-Maghrebi was reportedly removed from training in Afghanistan in the late 1990s by Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and was reassigned to al-Qa’ida’s media committee. It is unclear if al-Maghrebi has had any further operational experience since this time.[40]
Yazid Mebrak
Yazid Mebrak (aka Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Anabi, Abou ObeJda Youssef Al-Annabi, Abu- Ubaydah Yusuf Al-Inabi, Mebrak Yazid, Youcef Abu Obeida, Mibrak Yazid, Yousif Abu Obayda Yazid, Abou Youcef)
Yazid Mebrak has been the leader of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) since 2020, operating primarily throughout Algeria and Mali. A 2022 UN report confirmed that Mebrak was al-Qa’ida’s third most senior member after al-Zawahiri.[41] Reporting suggests that Mebrak has previously encouraged both domestic and international attacks and played a role in the global management of al-Qa’ida.[42] Mebrak reportedly has extensive operational experience in the Sahel and as a veteran of the Algerian civil war.[43] Media reporting suggests that Mebrak is currently suffering from long-term injuries and lacks the “charismatic pull” of the former leader of AQIM, Droukdel.[44] There is a realistic possibility that the announcement of Mebrak as Emir of al-Qa’ida could strengthen the group’s focus on localised regional conflicts rather than major directed attacks against the West.
Ahmed Diriye
Ahmed Diriye (aka Sheikh Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah, Abu Diriye)
As of 2014, Ahmed Diriye has been the head of al-Shabaab, the Somalia based affiliate of al-Qa’ida. It is alleged that al-Shabaab has morphed from an affiliate to a benefactor of al-Qa’ida, providing senior leadership with financial support, however, it is likely that al-Shabaab would renew their allegiance to al-Qa’ida following the announcement of a new leader.[45] There is a realistic possibility that Diriye could exploit the pending leadership gap in al-Qa’ida to reinforce his position within central al-Qa’ida and have more influence on the global strategy of the group in the long term.
Diriye has extensive operational experience within al-Shabaab:
- 2013 – Dirye is reported to have been a member of al-Shabaab’s internal police and intelligence arm – the “Amniyat”. The group’s members are allegedly highly trained intelligence operatives who have carried out assassinations and suicide operations.[46]
- November 2019 – Diriye appeared in a video naming the US as the group’s primary target and demanded supporters to attack American citizens wherever they could.[47] The video was reportedly followed by an attempted attack by al-Shabaab on Baledogle Airfield, a military base used by US forces in Somalia.[48]
There is a realistic possibility that racial tensions within al-Qa’ida could impact the likelihood of Diriye, or any other sub-Saharan leader, being considered worthy of leadership. Media reporting suggests that black members of al-Qa’ida have traditionally been used in lower-level operations such as suicide bombings as a result of racial biases. It is likely that any sub-Saharan leader would struggle to exert influence on the group’s overall operational strategy as a result of systemic racism within the organisation.[49]
What Could a New Leader Mean for al-Qa’ida?
Organisational Rebuild and Possible Bases of Operation
- There is a realistic possibility that the new leader of al-Qa’ida could exploit the 2021 withdrawal of allied troops from Afghanistan to use the country as a “safe haven” for terrorism-related activity. It is likely that a diminished western presence in Afghanistan has created an environment that is more permissive to terrorism-related activity and significantly limited the ability of the West to target foreign terrorist actors.
- There is a realistic possibility that the Haqqani Network could enable al-Qa’ida to once again use Afghanistan as a base of operations in the near future. The Haqqani Network has long been the primary connection between the Taliban and al-Qa’ida senior leadership.[50] Media reporting suggests that al-Zawahiri was residing in a safehouse owned by a top aide to the Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, when he was killed.[51]
- It is unlikely that the Afghan Taliban currently has the capability to contain all foreign militant groups within Afghanistan. Media reporting suggests that ongoing international sanctions and the withdrawal of international aid to Afghanistan has limited the Taliban’s ability to finance effective counter-insurgency operations and security apparatus throughout the country.[52]
- Affiliate groups such as al-Shabaab have increasingly demonstrated the ability to act independently of al-Qa’ida senior leadership and provide support to the group’s core. If al-Adel and al-Maghrebi are unable to lead al-Qa’ida from Iran, there is a realistic possibility that al-Qa’ida senior leadership could shift their strategic centre of power away from Afghanistan to Africa. The increasingly permissive environments and porous border regions in Africa would likely be an attractive alternative for al-Qa’ida to establish external attack capabilities and avoid ongoing counterterrorism operations against the group’s senior leadership.
Operational Strategy
- While it is highly likely that groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida senior leadership are currently focused on regional priorities and lack the central direction necessary to project an external threat at this time, there is a realistic possibility that a new leader could place a greater priority on conducting attacks against the UK in the long term through the coordination of the group’s global affiliates.
- It is almost certain that any new leader would require bayat (pledge of allegiance) from affiliate leaders to maximise the group’s geopolitical influence and ensure control of affiliate groups. Letters attributed to bin Laden allegedly demonstrated bin Laden’s concern over the actions of affiliate organisations and the impact activities that are not approved by al-Qa’ida senior leadership could have on the group. It is almost certain that any new leader would seek to balance the wants of affiliate leaders with the reputation of al-Qa’ida as an organisation.
- Although it is almost certain that affiliate groups would maintain formal ties with al-Qa’ida senior leadership, there is a realistic possibility that a long-term lack of leadership could increase the intent of regional leaders to focus their efforts on local conflicts and the improvement of their own independent operational capabilities, independent of al-Qa’ida senior leadership.[53]
- There is a realistic possibility that certain al-Qa’ida affiliates are closely aligned with the group’s core leadership and could have the ability to influence the strategic and operational direction of al-Qa’ida in the long term.
- For example, in 2022, UN Member States reported that al-Shabaab supports al-Qa’ida core directly from its internal funds.[54] UN Member States estimated that al-Shabaab command between 7000-12,000 operatives and remain undiminished in capacity at this time. al-Shabaab allegedly generated between $10-150 million per annum from its taxation of the economy of Somalia and used at least 25% of its revenue for military purchases.[55]
Outlooks: What are the Implications of a New al-Qa’ida Leader for the UK?
- al-Qa’ida will maintain the intent to project threat toward the UK. There is a realistic possibility that the appointment of a new leader could alter the strategic direction of the group to prioritise this intent in the long term.
- It is highly likely that any terrorist attack directed or inspired by al-Qa’ida in the UK would be conducted by an individual or small cell using a low-sophistication methodology, e.g., Bladed or Blunt Force Weapon, Vehicle as a Weapon, Fire as a Weapon etc.
- It is highly likely that the predominant threat posed by al-Qa’ida to the UK at this time is from the online radicalisation of vulnerable UK-based individuals, and the subsequent inspiration to conduct these aforementioned low-sophistication attacks within the UK.
- E.g., UN Member States highlighted the new pro-al-Qa’ida English-language magazine, “Mujahideen in the West”, as a continued threat. The magazine, produced by Hurras al-Tawheed, allegedly caters to a younger audience of prospective followers and continues to incite lone-actor terrorist attacks in Europe.[56]
- It is likely that certain UK-based individuals inspired by and with links to al-Qa’ida would seek to radicalise vulnerable individuals in-person to facilitate extremism and terrorism-related activity in the UK.
- It is unlikely that al-Qa’ida would have the capability to conduct a direct, coordinated attack against the UK mainland at this time due to diminished organisational structures, lack of overtly strong global leadership, and continued focus on regional conflicts.
- There is a realistic possibility that any terrorist attack directed or inspired by al-Qa’ida in the UK could feature a high-sophistication methodology. E.g., Improvised Explosive Device, Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device, or Marauding Firearms attack. However, UK police and security services have continued to demonstrate the ability to disrupt complex and high-sophistication attack plots.
- The death of al-Zawahiri demonstrates the continued capability of Western countries to successfully conduct operations against high value terrorist targets throughout Afghanistan and the Middle East. As such, disrupting the ability of groups such as al-Qa’ida to effectively coordinate major attacks against the West.
Report Ends – Intelligence Cut Off Date: 22 May 2023
Expert Insight
Despite claims by the UN monitoring team that Saif ul Adl has moved to Afghanistan, most sources agree that he is still there, including US intelligence. Sources within Iran’s IRGC confirm that he is still there (as of June 2023) and that since the killing of Al Zawahiri there have been discussions between AQ and the Iranian regime about the latter allowing him out of the country. AQ cannot appoint a new leader who is based in Iran, whether Saif ul Adl or anybody else. Although the delay in choosing a successor to Al Zawahiri is often attributed to the desire not to embarrass the Taliban, who deny he was killed on Afghan soil, the real reason is much more likely to be that the top candidate to the succession, Saif ul Adl, is in Iran and cannot get out or does not want to.
The AQ dossier in Iran is managed by the IRGC, within which there have long been debates about the pros and cons of hosting AQ leaders there. The predominant view seems to be that for now Iran should keep cooperating with AQ, given that the group and Iran at least agree on increasing their presence in Africa as their main theatre for operations. Although AQ is increasingly showing reluctance in confronting the Islamic State, which is one Iran’s primary aims, there is still room for cooperation in smuggling and trafficking., as well as in undermining the residual influence of western governments across the continent.
After the end of the war in Afghanistan, the IRGC considered the option of encouraging AQ to restart operations in Europe, with IRGC support. IRGC sources say that these plans have been dropped due to the opposition of both president Rouhani and president Raisi. Although the IRGC often acts without the consent of the president, Raisi is now very close to Supreme Leader Khamenei and the IRGC does not want to attract Khamenei’s ire. Raisi’s diplomatic successes mean that he is now all bent on improving relations with the US and Europe too and Khamenei seems to be on board. The risk of AQ’s attack in Europe being attributed to Iran would be too great and anyway such attacks would not have a real strategic purpose at the moment, other than IRGC’s desire to undermine Raisi (with whom the IRGC has serious disagreements).
Without Iranian support, AQ’s capabilities are limited. It cannot raise large sums anymore from wealthy donors and it even has to ask local affiliates, such as Al Shabaab, to support it financially. Aside from Iran, AQ also lacks real safe havens. AQ has distrusted the Taliban since at least 2007, but the intensifying targeting of its cadres in Afghanistan from 2019 onwards, culminating in the killing of Al Zawahiri in 2022, discourage it from considering Afghanistan a place where any of its senior figures should reside. At present, European police sources see AQ as not being in the position to organise significant attacks in Europe. While it remains possible that lone wolf attacks might be inspired by AQ even in Europe, its propaganda operations are relatively muted, compared to the Islamic State’s, and it seems much more likely that the latter will remain the main source of inspiration for loose terrorists. By contrast, expanding operations in Africa would help AQ self-fund, allow it to keep a lower profile while going through a difficult transition, and possible see new safe havens being established.
Dr Antonio Giustozzi, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI
PHIA Scale
The “Probability Yardstick” (below) is a standardised instrument used to provide professional intelligence assessments. Judgements made using the yardstick are relative and reflect the analyst’s confidence in their findings and assessments.
-
- Almost Certain: An event is assessed to have a greater than 90% chance of occurring.
- Highly Likely: An event is assessed to have a 76% to 90% chance of occurring.
- Likely: An event is assessed to have a 55% to 75% chance of occurring.
- Realistic Possibility: An event is assessed to have a 40% to 54% chance of occurring.
- Unlikely: An event is assessed to have a 25% to 39% chance of occurring.
- Highly Unlikely: An event is assessed to have an 10% to 24% chance of occurring.
- Remote Chance: An event is assessed to have a less than 10% chance of occurring.
Time Spans
-
- Short Term: 0 – 6 Months.
- In the next 12 months.
- Medium Term: 12 months – 5 Years.
- Long Term: 5+ Years.
End Notes
[1] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/pdf/N2303891.pdf
[2] Iran-based Egyptian Saif al-Adel is new al Qaeda chief, says US (france24.com)
[3] September 11 Attacks: Facts, Background & Impact – HISTORY
[4] 7 July London bombings: What happened that day? – BBC News
[5] AQAP: Charlie Hebdo attack was years in the making | CNN
[6] Yemen al-Qaeda chief al-Wuhayshi killed in US strike – BBC News
[7] Son of Qaeda Founder Is Dead – The New York Times (nytimes.com)
[8] Asim Umar: Al-Qaeda’s South Asia chief ‘killed in Afghanistan’ – BBC News
[9] Al-Qaeda chief in north Africa Abdelmalek Droukdel killed – France – BBC News
[10] Al Qaeda’s Abu Muhammad al-Masri Secretly Killed in Iran – The New York Times (nytimes.com); Iran denies al-Qaeda leader was killed in Tehran – BBC News
[11] U.S. identifies additional al Qaeda leaders in Iran | FDD’s Long War Journal
[12] Asfandyar Mir on the Taliban Harboring al-Qaida Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri | United States Institute of Peace (usip.org); Ayman al-Zawahiri assassination: The Taliban’s biggest crisis | Taliban | Al Jazeera; Ayman al-Zawahiri: Shock in Kabul as US kills al-Qaeda leader – BBC News
[13] Microsoft Word – 10_v1-T_Draft Text – Edited (For State).docx; 02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf (state.gov); The Doha Agreement did not specify that the Taliban had to expel or hand over members of al-Qa’ida present in Afghanistan.
[14] 02.29.20-US-Afghanistan-Joint-Declaration.pdf (state.gov); Biden: Killing of al-Qaida leader is long-sought ‘justice’ | AP News
[15] Profile: Saif al Adel of al Qaeda | Wilson Center; Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi – Rewards For Justice
[16] Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets (brookings.edu); Apostates are those viewed as “Muslims who have abandoned Islam”.
[17] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[18] This Coming Terror, Ali Soufan
[19] S_2021_655_E.pdf (securitycouncilreport.org); CTC-SENTINEL-022021.pdf (westpoint.edu)
[20] Zawahiri’s Death and What’s Next for al Qaeda (csis.org); Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[21] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[22] This Coming Terror, Ali Soufan; Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[23] #298: 05-15-03 AL QAEDA ASSOCIATES CHARGED IN ATTACK ON USS COLE, ATTEMPTED ATTACK ON ANOTHER U.S. NAVAL VESSEL (justice.gov); NEWSMAKER Al Qaeda’s new leader Adel has $10 million bounty on his head | Reuters
[24] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[25] This Coming Terror, Ali Soufan; Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[26] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[27] The Shura Council is a consulting council which discussed and approved major undertakings. AQ also had a “military committee which considered and approved “military” matters; Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; This Coming Terror, Ali Soufan
[28] The Last Hope for the al-Qa`ida Old Guard? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[29] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[30] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[31] Ibid.
[32] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[33] This Coming Terror, Ali Soufan
[34] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; Leadership from Iran: How Al-Qaeda in Yemen Fell Under the Sway of Saif al-Adel – Sana’a Center For Strategic Studies (sanaacenter.org)
[35] as-Sahab provide original sermons by al-Qa’ida commanders, footage of al-Qa’ida insurgent attacks, and international terrorist operations carried out by the group to followers around the world; Muhammad Abbatay a.k.a. Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi | Counter Extremism Project; Microsoft PowerPoint – nefajihadmedia0309.ppt (cia.gov)
[36] U.S. identifies additional al Qaeda leaders in Iran | FDD’s Long War Journal; Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi – Rewards For Justice
[37] Muhammad Abbatay a.k.a. Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi | Counter Extremism Project; The Question of Succession in Al-Qaida | RAND; Morocco: Abu Rahman al-Maghrebi may succeed al-Zawahiri as head of al-Qaeda (theafricareport.com)
[38] Al-Qa`ida’s Soon-To-Be Third Emir? A Profile of Saif al-`Adl – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
[39] MEMRI JTTM Weekly – April 29-May 6, 2023 | MEMRI
[40] Muhammad Abbatay a.k.a. Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi | Counter Extremism Project
[41] N2239429.pdf (un.org)
[42] Explained Who Will Be The Next Al-Qaeda Leader And What Is The Process To Pick New Emir (india.com)
[43] Factbox: Who could succeed Al Qaeda’s leader Zawahiri? | Reuters
[44] CTC-SENTINEL-082022.pdf (westpoint.edu)
[45] Al-Qaida Succession Plan Being Put to Test (voanews.com)
[46] Who is Sheikh Ahmed Umar, Al-Shabaab’s Ruthless New Leader? (ibtimes.co.uk)
[47] Ahmed Diriye (a.k.a. Abu Diriye, Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah) | Counter Extremism Project; Al-Shabab Chief Partially Seen on Video for First Time (voanews.com)
[48] Somalia: Jihadists attack US training base at Baledogle – BBC News
[49] https://www.cfr.org/blog/racism-obstructs-extremism-mali; rn-sping2015-casestudy.ashx (ida.org)
[50] Zawahiri’s Death and What’s Next for al Qaeda (csis.org)
[51] Biden: Killing of al-Qaida leader is long-sought ‘justice’ | AP News; The Taliban in Afghanistan (cfr.org)
[52] Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban | Crisis Group; Explained: the relationship between the Taliban and Isis | The Week UK
[53] Zawahiri’s Death and What’s Next for al Qaeda (csis.org)
[54] S 2022 547.pdf (securitycouncilreport.org)
[55] N2303891.pdf (un.org)
[56] N2303891.pdf (un.org)
Author: Oliver Hair ASyI,
Junior Threat Analyst
Read Time: 10 minutes
