By Jerry Smith OBE, Senior Partner, CHC Global
Background
The University of Marylands Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that the majority of mass casualty attacks in Western Europe now employ low complexity Methodology involving the use of vehicles or knives as weapons. Nonetheless, there were still two mass casualty attacks in the region in 2019 which involved the use of firearms.
The increasing frequency of rudimentary Methodology reflects changes in the character and intent of the main terrorist threat actors in recent years, as well as improved counter-terrorism and general law enforcement efforts in the control of firearms and explosive materials. However, these Methodology continue to represent the most effective means of carrying out mass casualty attacks.
Threat
Terrorism threat is commonly measured in terms of intent and capability. The former element consists of the psychological and organisational factors such as objectives, risk tolerance and appetite for violence. Capability is a measure of the means available from access to weapons, to the technical know-how of building a weapon and using it in an attack. For the vast majority of potential terrorists in the UK, capability, in regards to access and ability to use firearms and explosives, is far outweighed by intent.
The lowering of the UK threat level to SUBSTANTIAL in November 2019 was encouraging; but the Head of Counter Terrorism Policing emphasised that an attack is (still) likely.
Intent
Europols 2020 Terrorism Situation and Trend (TE-SAT) report recorded 119 completed, failed, or foiled terrorist attacks in 2019. Almost half were attributed to Northern Irish dissident groups, with many more linked to other national/separatist movements on the continent. Despite this, Europol found that all casualties from extremist attacks were caused by either Islamist or far right actors, with the former accounting for the vast majority.
This reflects the fact that the intent to carry out mass casualty attacks is far more prevalent amongst Islamist (and, more recently, extreme right-wing) terrorists than amongst long-standing national/separatist or leftist groups. The employment of low-complexity Methodology by these threat actors in Europe is a consequence of limits to their capability their inability to source more lethal weaponry rather than to their intent.
Capability
The two key elements of capability the ability to acquire the peril (firearms/ explosives) and the skills to employ effectively are exemplified in the 2019 Halle synagogue attack in Germany. The attacker had improvised firearms; but the unreliability of his weapons and ammunition, and his limited tactical handling experience, along with effective security, meant that larger numbers of casualties were thankfully avoided.
Analysis of criminal networks suggests that large volumes of firearms continue to reach Western Europe across its porous borders with the Balkans and Ukraine, with some of these ending up in the hands of terrorists. The repurposing of blank firing and deactivated firearms, along with the increasing prevalence of 3D printed weapons (as seen in Halle), remains another means to develop a viable, if unreliable, weapon.
In the UK, the National Crime Agency’s (NCA) Operation Venetic, a countrywide operation in 2020 targeting serious organised crime, resulted in a large number of arrests and the recovery of 77 firearms including an assault rifle, sub-machine guns, four grenades and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Whilst the majority of such weapons tend to be used by criminals against rivals, the NCA noted that the small number of seizures of fully automatic weapons were gradually increasing.
While some terrorists have exploited their criminal connections to acquire firearms, the crime terror nexus is often downplayed, with commentators assuming that organised criminals are averse to supplying terrorists with weapons for fear of attracting unwanted attention from police. While this is sometimes the case, most criminal arms dealers are usually either unaware of or disinterested in the intentions of those buying their wares. Therefore, a sustained increase in the supply of illegal weapons in Britain makes their procurement by terrorists more likely. Furthermore, while most terrorists in Britain will lack formal training or weapons-handling experience, these need not be major obstacles, as demonstrated by the murder of Jo Cox MP in 2015.
Significant progress has been made in reducing the ability of terrorists to acquire the precursors to manufacture improvised explosives. Stringent controls on the composition and management of agricultural fertiliser has reduced the ease with which an ammonia-nitrate-based bomb could now be built. However, in 2019, a British newspaper reported that three tons of such material had been found by UK police in 2015. The sources were unnamed, but it was claimed that the Lebanese terrorist organisation Hezbollah had stockpiled the fertiliser in north west London close to a large Jewish community. This discovery suggests that there remains the possibility that sufficient quantities of controlled material can still be acquired to build what could have been the largest improvised bomb in the UK. However, it is also reasonable to assess that such a well-connected and funded organisation, actively supported by Iran, has capabilities well in excess of other non-state actor groups.
Acetone-peroxide-based improvised explosives are more challenging to legislate against. These can be made from common household products such as drain cleaner and paint thinners, with many how to recipes on the darker corners of the internet. But access to this capability can come at a price these explosives can be extremely sensitive to shock. In 2017, immediately prior to the Barcelona vehicular impact and knife attacks, two members of the terror group were killed when the peroxide-based explosive they were making detonated prematurely.
Conclusions
The collective data suggest that, whilst mass casualty attacks are down in Europe, the intent to cause fatalities remains. It was recently reported that UK authorities had interdicted 25 terrorist plots since the Westminster Bridge attack in March 2017 a rate of around one plot every two months, with roughly 800 live investigations ongoing. 2020 has already seen two convictions against individuals who separately planned to bomb St Paul’s Cathedral and attack a London Pride march. The bomber had got to the stage of sourcing a manufacturer for the improvised explosives and had conducted a hostile reconnaissance of her target.
The ability to match capability to this intent continues to be a challenge for terrorists in the UK. The potential for trained and experienced returning Islamist fighters from Iraq and Syria remains viable. Such technical skills may also be available to right-wing groups, with a small number having connections to, or being former members of, the military. But unless they can acquire firearms from underworld connections, or steal from a legitimate source, they will have either to manufacture their firearms and explosive risking malfunctions, injury, or arrest or to conduct less sophisticated attacks.
It cannot be concluded that the risk of a firearms or explosive attack in the UK has increased significantly. But the number of criminally connected individuals, Islamist, far right, or otherwise, who can acquire, and have the experience to use, firearms and explosives has the potential to increase. Whilst there is little evidence of a systematic nexus between organised crime and terrorism, petty criminal linkages may provide the opportunistic acquisition pathway that cannot be ignored.