Police Officer Allegedly Shot by New IRA in Omagh, Northern Ireland

• It is highly likely that the operational capability of NIRT actors across Northern Ireland has been significantly diminished by the PSNI and wider UK security services’ ability to disrupt terrorist networks and monitor attack planning throughout the country.

• It is almost certain that NIRT actors maintain the intent to conduct attacks against members of the security services in Northern Ireland. DCI Caldwell had reportedly received several threats in the past and was aware that his investigations into NIRT made him a high-profile target.[4]

• It is highly likely that a reduction in overall NIRT operational capability in Northern Ireland has led to any remaining self-identifying affiliates of the IRA to align more closely with low-level criminality than coordinated terrorist activity. It is highly likely that NIRT actors with the intent to conduct terrorist attacks would seek to exploit links to low-level criminal networks to acquire attack capabilities such as small firearms.

• In comparison to the high-level of access to sophisticated attack capabilities demonstrated by IRA-affiliated terrorist actors throughout The Troubles in Northern Ireland (approx. 1969-1998), it is highly unlikely that current affiliates of the latest iteration of the IRA would have equivalent access to attack capabilities such as large Improvised and/or Military-Grade Explosive Devices.

• It is highly unlikely that actors affiliated with NIRT have the ability to inspire the degree of support enjoyed by earlier iterations of groups such as the Provisional IRA (PIRA). It is currently unlikely that there is wider mainstream republican support for the use of acts of terrorism to affect political change in Northern Ireland.

• There is a realistic possibility that current political issues related to Northern Ireland could serve to radicalise existing NIRT actors, and individuals vulnerable to extreme republican messaging, towards terrorism-related activity. In the short term, issues that could affect stability in Northern Ireland and impact the trajectory of NIRT, include but are not limited to the BREXIT deal between the UK and the EU (Northern Ireland protocol); political deadlock in Stormont; and a change in the UK monarchy.

• Throughout The Troubles in Northern Ireland (approx. 1969-1998), NIRT actors regularly demonstrated the capability to conduct highly sophisticated IED and Military-Grade Explosive attacks on the UK mainland. Examples include: two large-scale bombings in the city of London (Baltic Exchange 1992 and Bishopsgate 1993); Brighton Hotel bombing (1984); Hyde Park and Regent’s Park London bombings (1982); Large-scale bombing in Manchester (1996); M62 Coach Bombing (Yorkshire, 1974).
• It is highly likely that whilst the overall operational capability of NIRT actors has been diminished, the greatly reduced number of NIRT-affiliated individuals would maintain the intent to conduct attacks of similar significance on the UK mainland in order to further the currently uncoordinated objectives of NIRT ideology and to further the legacy of their forebears.
• At this time, it is highly unlikely that any NIRT actor would have the capability to project a terrorist attack against the UK mainland. The two most recent NIRT-related attacks against the UK mainland featured variations of a letter bomb attack methodology against targets including military recruitment sites across the UK in 2014, and Heathrow Airport, Waterloo train station, and London City Airport in 2019.[5]
• In the event of a NIRT-related attack conducted on the UK mainland, it is highly likely that actors would prioritise the targeting of property over indiscriminate attacks against the public. It is likely that any attack against people would be targeted at individuals, such as, specific politicians and military and intelligence-related personnel (current and retired).

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 09 March 2023