Germany Faces Increased Terrorism Threat 

Sep 16, 2024 | Threat Analysis, Threat Landscape


Author: Oliver Hair ASyI,
Threat Analyst

Read Time: 3 minutes 

Timeline  

  • On 23 August 2024, Issa Al H, 26-years-old, conducted a Bladed Weapons attack in the West German city of Solingen {1}. The individual conducted the attack at approximately 21:40 at a free music concert during the “Festival of Diversity”; a festival celebrating the 650-year history of Solingen. Three individuals were killed and eight others were injured, four of them severely. German authorities arrested the perpetrator on 25 August 2024 after he turned himself into police and claimed responsibility for the attack {2}. 
  •  On 05 September 2024, an 18-year-old was shot dead in proximity to the Israeli consulate in Munich after exchanging fire with police. In a joint statement, the Bavarian state police and prosecutors stated that they believed the individual was planning a terrorist attack involving the consulate {3}. The incident took place on the anniversary of the 1972 Munich Olympics terror attack. It remains unclear if the incident was linked to the anniversary. The Bavarian attorney general’s office stated that the suspect may have been influenced by religious extremism and was previously known to the authorities in connection to an Islamist ideology {4}. There were no fatalities or injuries.  
  •  On 06 September 2024, a 29-year-old conducted a Bladed Weapons attack against a police station in Linz am Rhein. The individual reportedly entered the police station with a machete and made threats to kill everyone inside. He was later arrested by police. Reporting suggests that the individual was inspired by an Islamist ideology and had hand-drawn a flag of Islamic State in his bedroom{5}. There were no fatalities or injuries {6} 
  • On 13 September 2024, a 27-year-old was arrested in Bavaria on suspicion of planning a Bladed Weapons attack against soldiers on their lunch break. Prosecutors allege that the individual purchased two machetes in an attempt to attack Bundeswher soldiers in Hof, Bavaria. The individual was reportedly inspired by an Islamist ideology {7}. 

    Event Assessment

     

    Tensions Remain in Germany 

    • It is highly likely that heightened community tensions in Germany, driven primarily by the perceived effects of the refugee and cost of living crises, will act as a driver of extremism within the country in the short term.  
    • There is a realistic possibility that increased polarisation of politics in Germany and the German government’s decision to make movement into the country harder could be used by Islamist actors as propaganda to radicalise and recruit vulnerable individuals.  

    Heightened Islamist Terrorism Threat 

    • As demonstrated by the above incidents, it is almost certain that Islamist terrorism remains the predominant threat to the UK and Western Europe at this time. 
    • It is almost certain that the predominant threat posed by Islamist terrorism in the UK and Western Europe at this time comes from self-radicalised individuals, rather than coordinated, directed attacks from global Islamist networks.  
    • It is almost certain that there would be an increased Islamist terrorism threat as a result of the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict at this time. Since the onset of conflict, global Islamist networks have released a range of concerted propaganda campaigns to encourage terrorist attacks in response to the conflict {8}.  
    • There is a realistic possibility that the above incidents in Germany could inspire further “copycat”-style attacks throughout Western Europe and the UK in the short term. Following the 23 August Solingen attack, Islamic State’s al-Naba newsletter celebrated the attack and encouraged further violence in response to the Israel-Hamas conflict {X}.  
    • Whilst it is almost certain that Islamic State actors currently operating in the Middle East and Central Asia maintain the intent to inspire, coordinate, and conduct terrorist attacks against the UK and Western Europe, it is unlikely that Islamic State would regain a comparable level of strength to its peak (approx. 2014-2017) in the long term. 
    • It is highly likely that Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), an affiliate of Islamic State based in Afghanistan, has become the group’s most capable outfit and currently poses the most significant threat to the UK. ISKP have previously demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct sophisticated, directed attacks externally, including: 
      • March 2024 – Russia – Four ISKP members entered the Crocus City Hall in Krasnogorsk, Moscow, and conducted a Firearms and Fire as a Weapon attack (FaW). The perpetrators targeted an estimated 6,000 people at a rock concert and set fire to the venue. The roof of the concert hall later collapsed. Reporting suggests that there were at least 139 fatalities and more than 100 others were injured {10}. 
      • January 2024 – Iran – ISKP claimed responsibility for two simultaneous Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) attacks in Iran at a memorial for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, Qassem Soleimani. There were 84 fatalities {11}. 

    Low Sophistication Methodologies Remain a Threat  

    • The predominant use of Bladed Weapons in the above incidents demonstrates the almost certain intent and capability of terrorist actors to use low-sophistication methodologies to conduct attacks due to weapons like blades being easily accessible and the minimal level of training needed to use them. 
    • Global Islamist networks have repeatedly encouraged low sophistication attacks in the UK and Western Europe. For example, in 2014, Senior Islamic State commander Abu Muhammad al-Adnani encouraged Islamic State supporters to launch attacks against the enemy using whatever means necessary. The speech has since been used by a range of Islamist propaganda outfits to encourage low sophistication attacks {X}. 
    • There is a realistic possibility that terrorist actors could have the capability to gain access to firearms in the UK at this time, similar to that used in the 05 September incident above. However, It is highly likely that UK firearm legislation and border control processes have significantly reduced the capability of terrorist actors to access weaponry in the UK {X}. 

    Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 16 September 2024

      PHIA Scale

      The “Probability Yardstick” (below) is a standardised instrument used to provide professional intelligence assessments. Judgements made using the yardstick are relative and reflect the analyst’s confidence in their findings and assessments.

        • Almost Certain: An event is assessed to have a greater than 90% chance of occurring.
        • Highly Likely: An event is assessed to have a 76% to 90% chance of occurring.
        • Likely: An event is assessed to have a 55% to 75% chance of occurring.
        • Realistic Possibility: An event is assessed to have a 40% to 54% chance of occurring.
        • Unlikely: An event is assessed to have a 25% to 39% chance of occurring.
        • Highly Unlikely: An event is assessed to have an 10% to 24% chance of occurring.
        • Remote Chance: An event is assessed to have a less than 10% chance of occurring.

        Time Spans

          • Short Term: 0 – 6 Months.
          • In the next 12 months.
          • Medium Term: 12 months – 5 Years.
          • Long Term: 5+ Years.

      Author: Oliver Hair ASyI,
      Threat Analyst

      Read Time: 3 minutes

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