The collapse of Daesh’s so-called “caliphate” has diminished the group’s mass appeal and crippled its ability to direct and coordinate strategic communications. While the group’s ability to propagandise is unlikely to be extinguished in the medium-term, it no longer possesses the resources, momentum or freedom of operation necessary to meaningfully reach overseas audiences on the scale or with the efficacy it had previously. Therefore, while attacks in the West by “self-radicalised” or “inspired” individuals are unlikely to abate entirely (especially while those supporters who were prevented from joining Daesh overseas remain free), far fewer of attacks directed from Daesh members in Syria and Iraq are anticipated in coming years. The group is instead likely to focus its efforts on its most devoted followers in support of the new amorphous, transnational operating model which the group appears to have adopted. This could lead to intensification of overseas attack planning by committed Daesh supporters. These plots, while much harder to execute than the low-complexity Methodology favoured by “inspired” actors, are typically more sophisticated and have greater impact in terms of both loss of life and damage to property.
Daesh has proven highly adept at strategic communications, effectively exploiting information technologies to reach large audiences around the globe. The group has also proved capable of adapting its narrative and messaging in response to changing circumstances in its Levantine heartland. With the collapse of its territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria, Daesh has recalibrated its propaganda efforts in line with its new strategic situation.
At its greatest territorial extent, Daesh’s al-Hayat media wing managed a sophisticated propaganda effort, overseeing the production of slick and voluminous online content for receptive audiences around the world. The group’s propaganda emphasised the purported military, social and religious accomplishments of its proto state, encouraging Hijra (emigration) by sympathisers to Iraq and Syria.
From 2016, with Daesh under growing pressure from Coalition action and extremist travel to the Middle East increasingly difficult, the group reframed its call for attacks by supporters in the West (first proposed in 2014) as a duty rather than an alternative to emigration. The call to action was accompanied by detailed advice for mounting attacks alone, credited with influencing the employment of low-complexity Methodology used by numerous terrorists since then. The tone of Daesh’s propaganda had also changed considerably. Themes of loyalty, sacrifice and revenge supplanted the more positive messaging commonplace in earlier material.[1]
The approach was an apparent success, with the frequency of inspired attacks in the West continuing to climb through to the second half of 2017.[2] However, by this time, the quantity and quality of propaganda released by the group had declined markedly as the group’s efforts came under increasing pressure from Coalition kinetic and network operations. While partially offset by global affiliates and grassroots supporters, by 2018 Daesh was producing a fraction of the material it had two years earlier.[3] It struggled to maintain a persistent presence on social media networks, and the group became more reliant on less accessible encrypted channels to communicate with supporters. Content segmentation also became less pronounced as the group’s core suffered from lack of resources and came to rely more on disparate franchises and individual influencers.[4] Centrally issued propaganda focused on sustaining the morale of core supporters rather than cultivating mass appeal abroad, with the last edition of Daesh’s flagship foreign language publication Rumiyah (formerly Dabiq) released in September 2017.
This corresponded with a drop-off in the number of attacks in Europe and North America in 2018.[5] Enhanced intelligence, security and risk mitigation measures undoubtedly played a crucial role in disrupting plots, but, while correlation does not imply causation, it is plausible that the declining volume, accessibility and efficacy of Daesh’s propaganda did contribute to the reduction in the number of successful attacks.
The existence of Daesh’s so-called “caliphate” and its subsequent erosion not only granted the group abundant media coverage and elevated its stature above that of terrorist groups; it was an animating force and powerful recruiting sergeant for the global violent Islamist milieu.
With the imminent loss of the last of its territory in Syria, Daesh recast its narrative, positing that the fall of its proto state was merely a temporary setback, and that the loss of territory was ultimately immaterial as the more significant objective of galvanising a global movement had been achieved.[6] This was accompanied by a reorganisation of Daesh’s Wilyat (notional province) structure, starting in late 2018, which minimised the importance of formerly held territory in Iraq and Syria as only two components of a much larger global “caliphate”. While the administrative reorganisation belies the tenuous links between Daesh’s leadership and its more distant adherents, it reflects the movement’s attempt to maintain its relevance to current and potential supporters and project an image of strength while it regroups in its Iraqi heartland.[7]
To this end, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, Daesh’s leader, made his first video appearance in five years in April. In his speech Baghdadi claimed responsibility for the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka and accepted Bayat (pledges of allegiance) from groups in Africa, while articulating a transnational future for the group. In addition to refuting claims of his death, the speech was likely intended to assert Baghdadi’s continuing authority over Daesh’s distant franchises and its remnants in the Levant and outline a strategy for the group’s future.[8]
It appears the message has largely been accepted by the group’s most committed supporters.[9] While the extent of Daesh’s involvement in the Easter bombings remains unclear, the attack was a major propaganda coup for the group, providing substance to Daesh’s claims and demonstrating it was still capable of orchestrating major attacks overseas. However, without its eponymous state in Iraq and Syria, Daesh is increasingly reliant on these kinds of attack to sustain its grandiose vision and retain the commitment of its supporters. While attacks in ungoverned or under-governed spaces will continued to be claimed and advertised by the group, those in less restless regions will, in propaganda terms, be much more rewarding for Daesh; attacks which demonstrate Daesh’s adaptability and organisational prowess even more so.
Therefore, the group is likely to redouble efforts to carry out complex attacks against Western interests. While British and allied intelligence services are alert to this threat, resource constraints inevitably mean that not every lead will be pursued, and the threat picture is further complicated by the diaspora of Daesh fighters which scattered following the group’s territorial collapse, and whose whereabouts are now uncertain. More than 200 British citizens alone who travelled to the Middle East to fight with Daesh still remain unaccounted for (the figure for Europe is believed to be roughly 2000)[10][11]. It is likely that a significant proportion of those still alive and at liberty remain committed to Daesh. Their linguistic and cultural knowledge represent a significant asset for Daesh and could be exploited for attack planning or developing cells in Europe.
Attacks by individuals inspired by Daesh’s ideology but acting independently are unlikely to abate entirely and these remain difficult to detect and interdict. Nonetheless, the very public setbacks faced by Daesh does appear to have diminished the group’s ability to further incite these types of attacks. However, Daesh retains a core of highly committed followers with the ability to fund, plan and execute attacks overseas. Among these are organised British-based extremists who either avoided prosecution or have recently been released from prison.[12] In the wake of the loss of the last of its territory in Iraq and Syria, the use of these capabilities is now critical to demonstrating the continued relevance of the group and sustaining its grand ambitions. Equally, the threat posed by other Islamist extremist groups, while overshadowed by Daesh, has not waned. Al Qaeda in particular continues to harbour the intent to conduct “spectacular attacks” against Western interests.
Therefore, the UK will continue to face the prospect of complex attacks for some time yet. While the targets favoured by Daesh – crowded places and symbolic sites – are unlikely to change, plots executed by well-funded and trained terrorists are likely to result in greater damage to property and more widespread business interruption.
[1] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41845285
[2] https://trac.poolre.co.uk/tmr-2018/DataCentre
[3] https://www.wired.co.uk/article/isis-islamic-state-propaganda-content-strategy
[4] https://icsr.infohttps://assets.poolre.co.uk/sitefiles/2018/07/ICSR-Report-A-Tale-of-Two-Caliphates-Comparing-the-Islamic-State%E2%80%99s-Internal-and-External-Messaging-Priorities.pdf
[5] https://trac.poolre.co.uk/tmr-2018/DataCentre
[6] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/the-sri-lanka-bombings-were-a-preview-of-isiss-future/588175/
[7] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2018/01/18/what-happens-when-isis-goes-underground/
[8] https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/what-the-baghdadi-video-means.html
[9] https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/04/the-sri-lanka-bombings-were-a-preview-of-isiss-future/588175/
[10] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/uk-isis-recruits-syria-return-british-caliphate-terrorism-jihadis-a8781056.html
[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/middleeast/islamic-state-attacks-europe.html
[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/world/europe/uk-extremist-cell-anjem-choudary.html