April Monthly Terrorism Update

• On 03 March 2025, a 40-year-old German man, named Alexander S by local media, drove a vehicle into a group of people on a pedestrianised shopping street in Mannheim, Germany. Two people were killed and several others were injured. The attack was allegedly deliberate but German authorities have said there was no indication of a political or religious motive. Investigators stated that the suspect was mentally ill. At this time, the motivation for the attack remains unknown {1}{2}{3}.

• On 05 March 2025, Sheffield Crown Court heard that Christopher Ringrose, 34, Marco Pitzettu, 25, and Brogan Stewart, 25, allegedly plotted an Extreme Right-Wing inspired terrorist attack against mosques and synagogues in the UK. The accused reportedly attempted to acquire a “wide variety of weapons”, including swords, knives, axes, spears and crossbows. Stewart reportedly owned two deactivated machine guns, and had discussed how to reactivate the weapons. According to prosecutor Jonathan Sandiford KC, the individuals had gathered information on explosives and had attempted to construct a 3D-printed semi-automatic firearm. The accused were arrested in February 2024 when security services believed an attack could be imminent. The trial continues {4}{5}.

• On 13 March 2025, a 15-year-old boy from Northumberland, appeared in court for a preliminary hearing after he was charged with engaging in conduct in preparation for committing acts of terrorism. The boy allegedly planned an attack against local synagogues and a phone mast. He had reportedly purchased equipment and weapons, such as a crossbow, online in 2024. The boy was also charged with one count of membership of a proscribed organisation, reported to be the Extreme Right-Wing and White Supremacist group, the Base. A provisional trial date was set for 13 January 2026 {6}.

• On 14 March 2025, Faiz Shah, 23, Mohammad Comrie, 23, and Elijah Ogunnubi-Sime, 20, each received a sentence of eight years and one month imprisonment after they pleaded guilty to kidnap. On 26 August 2024, the perpetrators lured Itay Kashti, a Jewish-Israeli music producer to a remote property in Llanybydder, Wales. The individuals posed as representatives from a reputable music production company and invited Kashti to a “music workshop”. Kashti was attacked once he arrived at the property but later escaped. Judge Catherine Richards stated the individuals targeted Kashti due to his perceived wealth, Jewish-Israeli heritage and had reportedly exchanged messages related to “Palestinian land”. In one message a defendant referred to Kashti having been on “pro-Israeli marches”. The incident was not designated as terrorism {7}.

• On 19 March 2025, Nicholas Prosper, 19, was sentenced to life imprisonment after he used a Bladed Weapon and a Firearm to kill his mother, brother, and sister at their home in Luton on 13 September 2024. After he had killed his family, Prosper left his home with a loaded shotgun and additional cartridges with the intention to carry out a school shooting at his former primary school. He had planned to kill 30 young children and himself. Prosper was arrested on a nearby street before he could conduct his attack at the school. He had planned his attack for a year and had conducted extensive research online into mass shootings and extreme violence. The incident was not designated as terrorism {8}{9}.

• On 28 March 2025, Nasen Saadi, 20, of Croydon, was sentenced to life imprisonment after he conducted a fatal Bladed Weapons attack on Durley Chine Beach in Bournemouth on 24 May 2024. Saadi fatally stabbed one woman and another suffered 20 knife injuries but survived. Mrs Justice Johannah Cutts told the court Saadi had a “grievance against society as a whole, and women”, and that he wanted to “feel powerful”. Cutts also stated that Saadi had denied his guilt because he wanted the “notoriety of a trial” and to be recognised as a dangerous killer. The incident was not designated as terrorism {10}{11}.

• It is almost certain that Extreme Right-Wing terrorism will remain a significant terrorism threat to the UK in the long term, as demonstrated by several individuals appearing in court in March for offences related to Extreme Right-Wing inspired activity.

• Extreme Right-Wing terrorist actors have previously demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct attacks alone. According to the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), between 1999 and 2022, all but two of the 14 attacks related to an Extreme Right-Wing ideology were conducted by individuals {12}.

• As migration to the UK, the cost-of-living crisis, and political instability remain a driver of Extreme Right-Wing terrorism in the UK (and as demonstrated by a range of Extreme Right-Wing related activity in March) there is a realistic possibility that Extreme Right-Wing terrorist actors could increasingly develop the intent to conduct attacks in small cells (approx. 2-3 peoples), rather than alone.

• It is almost certain that Extreme Right-Wing terrorist actors would currently have the intent and capability to conduct a low sophistication attack in the UK. E.g., Bladed or Blunt Force Weapons, Vehicle as a Weapon, Fire as a Weapon.

• As demonstrated by the appearance of a 15-year-old in court for offences related to Extreme Right-Wing terrorism, it is highly likely that those aged 18 or younger will remain at risk of radicalisation by Extreme Right-Wing ideologues in the long term. This is almost certainly due to the continued proliferation of easily accessible online content and the increase in time spent online by children and young adults in the UK.

• It is likely that individuals who adhere to an Extreme Right-Wing ideology would also adhere to alternative views, including Accelerationism. As demonstrated by the appearance of an individual in court accused of plotting an attack against a phone mast, individuals adhering to an Accelerationist ideology have increasingly sought to target critical infrastructure, both at home and abroad. There is a realistic possibility that there could be a heightened threat to critical infrastructure from such actors in the long term {13}.

• For further information on The Current State of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism, please see Pool Re’s deep-dive report, here.

• As demonstrated by three high-profile trials involving the alleged targeting of the Jewish community in March, it is almost certain that there would be a heightened threat posed to synagogues and the Jewish community in the UK at this time.

• It is highly likely that the threat posed toward the Jewish community would remain dynamic and subject to change in line with developments in the Israel-Hamas conflict and other crises across the Middle East.

• It is highly likely that any terrorist attack conducted against a member or symbol of the Jewish community at this time would be conducted by an Extreme Right-Wing or Islamist terrorist as antisemitism remains a common tenet of both ideologies.

• It is almost certain that crises across the Middle East would continue to be exploited by terrorist actors globally in propaganda to encourage attacks, recruitment, and funding. Terrorist actors in the UK have previously demonstrated the intent and capability to conduct attacks inspired by the Israel-Hamas conflict, including:

• 2023 – Hartlepool – On 15 October 2023, Ahmed Ali Alid, a 45-year-old Hartlepool-based individual conducted a fatal terrorist attack in Hartlepool town centre, UK. Alid used a Bladed Weapon to attack and injure a housemate before killing a member of the public. Alid claimed the attack was motivated by the Israel-Hamas conflict {14}{15}.

• Although it is unlikely that any such incident would be designated as terrorism, terrorism-related incidents monitored throughout March by Pool Re’s Threat Analysis team showed an uptick in Non-Violent Direct Action (NVDA) and violent protest action related to the Israel-Hamas conflict, including:

• As demonstrated by activity recorded throughout March 2025, it is almost certain that Palestine Action would have the intent and capability to conduct disruptive activity against organisations associated with the Israeli arms trade in the next 12 months. It is unlikely any such act would be designated as terrorism at this time.

• There is a realistic possibility that members of Palestine Action could engage in acts of violence towards people associated with Israel’s arms trade, rather than property, in the long term if and when their demands are not met. It is highly likely that any protest-related terrorist attack would be conducted by an individual affiliated with, but not directed by, an organised protest group.

• It is highly likely that violence-fixated individuals pose an emerging threat to the UK. In March 2025, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and State Threats Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, noted the “increasingly recognised…internet-related cohort….obsessed with violence” {16}{17}.

• Rather than seeking to advance an external cause (E.g, Religious, political, ideological, etc.), it is highly likely that certain violence-fixated individuals would have the intent to gain “notoriety” from violent acts.

• • E.g., Timothy Cray KC stated that Prosper’s “main wish was to achieve lasting notoriety as a mass killer…and even surpass other mass killers around the world” {18}{19}.

• • E.g., Mrs Justice Johannah Cutts stated that Saadi “wished to feel the power of which felt society had robbed ” and that the “idea of being recognised as a dangerous killer became appealing to {20}.

• There is a realistic possibility that individuals with the intent to conduct violence in search of notoriety could adhere to a range of conflicting terrorist ideologies to create personal narratives that justify their actions. E.g., In October 2024, Director General of MI5, Sir Ken McCallum, noted a rise in “more volatile would-be terrorists with only a tenuous grasp of the ideologies they profess to follow” {21}{22}.

• There is a realistic possibility that the diversification of ideology and motivation found in would-be violent offenders could lead to greater variety in potential choice of targets.

• It is almost certain that terrorist actors in the UK would have the intent to conduct an attack using firearms. However, it is highly likely that UK firearm legislation and border control processes have significantly reduced the capability of terrorist actors to access weaponry in the UK.

• It is highly likely that deactivated and/or converted blank-firing weapons will continue to enter the UK and be used in criminal activity. According to the National Crime Agency (NCA), converted blank firearms are now used more than original lethal purpose firearms in the UK. Brogan Stewart’s reported discussions surrounding the reactivation of deactivated weapons demonstrates the potential intent of terrorist actors to convert deactivated weapons in the UK as part of their attack plans {23}{24}{25}.

• It is likely that terrorist actors in the UK would have the capability to convert deactivated weapons. On 09 July 2023, the National Crime Agency revealed that over 700 firearms had been recovered in the UK in a single operation. A significant proportion of the firearms were reactivated weapons. During the investigation, seven of the cases involved individuals with extremist views or a potential terrorism threat {26}.

• Although firearms certificate holders and registered firearms dealers are highly unlikely to be involved in terrorism, there is a realistic possibility that forged firearms certificates could be used to obtain a firearm to conduct a terrorist attack. E.g., Nicholas Prosper was able to purchase the firearm used in the murder of his mother, brother, and sister by using a forged firearms license that he had made himself {27}{28}.

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 31 March 2025