19 Individuals with Suspected Links to Terrorism Allegedly Enter the UK as Irregular Migrants

Apr 14, 2023 | Islamist Terrorism, Threat Analysis

Author: Julian Stone BEM, 
Principal Threat Analyst 

Read Time: 5 minutes 

Media reporting from several sources has alleged that 19 individuals with suspected links to terrorism were able to enter the UK through illegal migration networks in 2022.[1]

The suspects that were reportedly identified through biometric scanning upon entry to the UK include five Iraqis, five Iranians, four Afghans, four Somalis and one Libyan.[2] It is alleged that the individuals have links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State Khorasan Province (Afghanistan), and unspecified Iranian terrorist groups.[3]

The reporting has suggested that the majority of these individuals have made formal asylum claims to the UK whilst based in migrant hotels and are unable to be deported. The individuals are now reportedly under surveillance by police and UK security services.[4]

In an interview, Tony Smith, former head of the UK Border Force stated that during the evacuation of the “dangerously overcrowded” Manston refugee centre “not all security checks were done, and some could have been missed… my worry is that someone with terrorist intent has crept through that system”. [5]

Reportedly, over 45,000 individuals crossed the English Channel irregularly in 2022. The majority of these crossings were in small boats provided by criminal groups operating on the French coast.[6]

Assessment

  • It is almost certain that the vast majority of irregular refugee arrivals have no affiliation to terrorism in any way, and many will have been adversely affected by violent extremist groups in their home countries.
  • The demographic of the nationalities of irregular refugee arrivals on small boats changes regularly but consistently has high representation from: Albania, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. [7]
  • The reasons behind irregular migrant travel to the UK are split between economic, political, environmental or family related.
  • It is almost certain that a minute number of irregular refugee arrivals will have some connection or affiliation to global terrorist actors either directly or indirectly.
  • It is highly likely that global terrorist groups would seek to exploit European migrant networks in order to project operatives into Europe and in turn the UK. Due to the long and complex nature of navigating global migrant networks, there is a realistic possibility that any individuals sent to the UK on behalf of a terrorist group could act as facilitators rather than operatives; using extensive operational experience to support other UK based individuals to develop the intent and capability to conduct attacks in the UK rather than conducting an attack that leads to them being killed. There is also a realistic possibility that some terrorist groups could seek to exploit migrant channels to facilitate the smuggling of funds or various attack capabilities to the UK to enable attacks.[8]
  • In the past 10 years, there have been multiple terrorist attacks conducted by legal and illegal migrants on the European mainland. These include but are not limited to:
      • November 2015 – Paris – Two of three individuals that conducted Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device (PBIED) attacks against the Stade De France arrived into Europe through one of the Greek islands posing as refugees. They entered France on fake Syrian passports before playing a major role in the coordinated multi-site/ multi-phase attacks across Paris that killed up to 130 people across the city.[9]
      • April 2017 – Stockholm – A regular asylum seeker with Uzbekistani nationality and affiliation with ISIS conducted a Vehicle as a Weapon (VaW) attack using a large truck to drive through a busy public concourse before crashing into a store front and fleeing the scene. An undetonated IED device was discovered in the back of the vehicle. Five people were killed in this incident.[10]
      • December 2016 – Berlin – An individual of Tunisian nationality with strong affiliation to ISIS conducted a VaW attack using a hijacked truck to target a Christmas market in Berlin. The attacker had arrived in Europe by taking an illegal migrant boat from Tunisia to the Italian island of Lampedusa in the Mediterranean before gradually making his way to Germany. The attack led to the death of 13 people.[11]
  • At this time, it is highly likely that global terrorist groups such as ISIS, al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups would seek to prioritise regional terrorist operations in areas such as the Middle East and Africa instead of projecting directed attacks against the UK through irregular migrant networks.
  • It is highly likely that the mainstream politicisation of irregular English Channel migration by online and traditional media and the UK government will facilitate the radicalisation of a greater number of individuals towards extreme right, extreme left or extreme Islamist positioning in the next 12 months. As a result, there is a realistic possibility that some of these individuals could develop the intent to conduct a terrorist attack driven by any of these ideologies.
  • It is highly likely that there is a threat to migrants in the UK from right-wing terrorist actors. On 30 October 2022, an individual that had previously accessed extreme right-wing material conducted a Fire as a Weapon attack against a refugee centre in Dover using Molotov Cocktails. The attack led only to the death of the perpetrator and did no damage to the property.[12]
  • Throughout 2023, there have been a series of protests conducted by pro- and anti-refugee protest groups at migrant centres across the UK. One protest outside of a migrant hotel in Liverpool in February 2023 led to clashes between police, pro- and anti-refugee groups after a video that allegedly showed a migrant inappropriately approaching a young girl in Liverpool went viral; the validity of the video is unclear. The resulting violent protests led to the burning of a police van.[13] It is highly likely that there will continue to be protest and clashes outside of migrant centres in the UK in the next 12 months. There is a realistic possibility that these events could radicalise individuals towards developing the intent to conduct more violent acts in the medium term.
  • It is highly likely that groups affiliated with extreme Islamist ideology and radicalisation in the UK would seek to exploit the vulnerability of new migrant arrivals to the UK by running recruitment campaigns. Affiliates of extreme groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have reportedly organised multiple workshops for new migrants in areas surrounding migrant centres in order to recruit new members.[14]
  • It is highly likely that the level of irregular migration in the English Channel will remain at the same level or increase in intensity in the long term. This will be driven by multiple geo-political, environmental, and other factors that will continue to cause more individuals from eastern Europe, the Middle East, or Africa to need or want to travel to the UK.
  • In the long term, it is likely that there will continue to be terrorism threat associated with irregular migration to the UK. It is highly likely that any terrorist act related to migration would feature a low sophistication attack conducted against the migrant community by individuals motivated by extreme right-wing ideology; however, there is a realistic possibility that individuals with migrant status that become or are already radicalised by Islamist ideology could seek to conduct an attack in the UK in the medium to long term.

Intelligence Cut-Off Date: 14 April 2023

    PHIA Scale

    The “Probability Yardstick” (below) is a standardised instrument used to provide professional intelligence assessments. Judgements made using the yardstick are relative and reflect the analyst’s confidence in their findings and assessments.

      • Almost Certain: An event is assessed to have a greater than 90% chance of occurring.
      • Highly Likely: An event is assessed to have a 76% to 90% chance of occurring.
      • Likely: An event is assessed to have a 55% to 75% chance of occurring.
      • Realistic Possibility: An event is assessed to have a 40% to 54% chance of occurring.
      • Unlikely: An event is assessed to have a 25% to 39% chance of occurring.
      • Highly Unlikely: An event is assessed to have an 10% to 24% chance of occurring.
      • Remote Chance: An event is assessed to have a less than 10% chance of occurring.

    Author: Julian Stone BEM, 
    Principal Threat Analyst

    Read Time: 5 minutes 

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